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RATIONALIZATION AND INTERNAL CONTROL 
Improving Marine Corps Unit-Level Internal Management Controls for the 
Government-Wide Commercial Purchase Card Program 
 
“The General Accounting Office (GAO) has uncovered what may 
be the tip of the iceberg with regard to improper purchases by 
people empowered to buy using their government-wide purchase 
cards…”1
 
 Numerous newspaper articles and other reports echoing the 
issue highlighted by the preceding quote, coupled with other 
documents such as the Marine Corps’ semi-annual review of its 
Government-wide Commercial Purchase Card (GCPC) Program for the 
first half of fiscal year (FY) 2003, led the author of this 
article to review GCPC usage in the Marine Corps as the basis 
for a Naval Postgraduate School Master of Business 
Administration thesis.  The following paragraphs are a summation 
of the analysis made in that thesis by the author and Lieutenant 
Colonel Robert J. Darling, USMC.  Although the GCPC program has 
proven to be of tremendous value to the Department of Defense 
(DoD), it has also experienced high levels of fraud, waste, and 
abuse.  Many of the difficulties DoD has experienced with the 
GCPC program are results of weaknesses in the program’s internal 
control environment.  The recommendations in this article are 
offered as a means to improve that environment. 
 
The Government-Wide Commercial Purchase Card Program 
 
All federal agencies, including all components of the DoD, 
use the GCPC to make “micro-purchases” (purchases less than 
$2,500) from commercial vendors.  Although the cards can be used 
along with other contracting methods to pay for purchases up to 
$9,999,900,2 they are used extensively to buy low-dollar value 
items while avoiding the longer and more costly traditional 
acquisition process.  The simplification of the purchasing 
process provided by the GCPC program has sped delivery of low-
dollar value items to end users while also lowering the direct 
costs associated with making those purchases.  Unfortunately, 
the program has also experienced significant shortcomings in its 
internal control environment. 
The GCPC program grew out of the 1982 Presidential 
Executive Order 12352, Procurement Reform, which directed the 
DoD, as well as all executive agencies, to “Establish programs 
to simplify small purchases” along with other initiatives 
 
1. http://www.managementconcepts.com/acquisition/NavyCardarchive.asp, 24 Oct 03. 
2. EBUSOPSOFFINST 4200.1A, p. 1. 
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intended to streamline and simplify various governmental 
procurement processes.3  On July 6, 1998, the Department of the 
Navy (DoN) awarded a three-year contract (with options for 
extending the service period) to Citibank to provide purchase 
card services throughout the DoN.4  Currently managed by the DoN 
eBusiness Operations Office (EBUSOPSOFF), the program is part of 
the U.S. General Services Administration’s (GSA) “SmartPay” 
program, whose current contracts with five service providers 
(Bank of America, Bank One, Citibank, Mellon Bank, and U.S. Bank) 
are effective until November 29, 2003.5 
According to the executive summary of the June 27, 2002 DoD 
Charge Card Task Force Final Report, implementation of the GCPC 
program had resulted in an estimated savings of $900 million by 
the report date.6  The GCPC program generates these savings in 
two ways: 1) as a result of cost reductions from the automation 
and streamlining of purchase order processes; and 2) from 
rebates from card issuers based on volume of transactions.
The automation and streamlining of the acquisition process 
save the DoD an estimated $20 for every item purchased with the 
card as compared to the former, strictly paper-based, approval-
laden buying process.7  In 2002, GCPC cardholders made more than 
ten million purchases with their cards, saving the government in 
excess of $200 million in administrative costs.  As stated by 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial 
Officer Dov S. Zakheim at a June 27, 2002 press conference in 
regards to GCPC program cards, "...they really are essential to 
improving business practices."8
 In addition to saving the government money by automating 
and streamlining the acquisition process, card-issuing banks 
provide the government with cash rebates or refunds for early or 
on-time payment of bills.  The rebate or refund computation 
formula is included in the purchase card contract; the card 
issuer calculates the amount on a monthly basis for all 
purchases made with DoD GCPC program cards, and that calculation 
is verified by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS).  
Rebates or refunds attributable to the use of the government 
purchase cards are credited to operation and maintenance (O&M) 
accounts of the DoD.  Although individual military units or DoD 
organizations do not receive the rebates themselves, which would 
have the effect of increasing their O&M purchasing power, the  
 
 
3. Executive Order 12352, 17 Mar 1982. 
4. http://www.don-ebusiness.navsup.navy.mil, 30 Oct 2003. 
5. http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/channelView.do?pageTypeId=8199&channelPage=%2Fep%2Fchann
el%2FgsaOverview.jsp&channelId=-13497, 31 Oct 2003. 
6. 2002 DoD Charge Card Task Force Final Report, p. v. 
7. 2002 DoD Charge Card Task Force Final Report, p. 2-1. 
8. Defense Link, DoD Moves to Improve Charge Card Programs, 27 Jun 2002. 
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savings to DoD can be substantial.  Figure 1 shows the FY-03 
rebate savings amounts calculated (in thousands) through 
September 2003. 
 
 
GCPC Program Management 
 
For the DoN, including the Marine Corps, EBUSOPSOFF 
Instruction (EBUSOPSOFFINST) 4200.1A is the current instruction 
which outlines GCPC program management procedures and 
responsibilities.  The GCPC program is administered under the 
hierarchical structure depicted in Figure 2.  At the lowest 
level of the GCPC program is the actual GCPC cardholder.  Next 
is the Approving Official (AO), responsible for approving the 
cardholder’s purchases and certifying monthly invoices from 
Citibank.  The unit-level (level five) Agency Program 
Coordinator (APC) supervises the entire unit’s GCPC program for 
the Head of Activity (HA), normally the unit’s Commanding 
Officer.  Above the HA are additional APC levels, individuals 
responsible for coordinating an ever-broadening scope of the 
GCPC program, up to the Major Claimancy level (level three). 
Training for all GCPC program participants can be 
accomplished on-line and consists of a minimum of two parts.  
Training tailored to individual roles within the GCPC program is 
offered on the Navy’s e-Business website; additionally, GCPC 
program participants must take the GCPC program tutorial offered 
through the Defense Acquisition University Continuous Learning 
Center.  
Once training is completed, DoN GCPC program participants 
are required to adhere to the program administration rules 
outlined in the EBUSOPSOFFINST 4200.1A.  AOs can supervise up to 
seven separate cardholder accounts and are responsible for 
overseeing and auditing those accounts, while a level five APC 
can be assigned to oversee up to three hundred individual 
cardholder accounts.  Once a cardholder has been officially 
assigned as such by his HA, an APC sets up the cardholder’s 
account with Citibank, normally on-line, and the cardholder then 
receives a GCPC program card directly from Citibank.  The unit 
APC also ensures cardholders and AOs attend required refresher 
training, facilitates the issuance of the card to the cardholder, 
and sets the cardholder’s single purchase and monthly 
transaction limits, as designated by the HA. 
GCPC program cards are issued individually to cardholders and, 
although stating that the card is to be used only for official 
U.S. Government purchases, bear the cardholder’s name.  The 
cardholder is responsible for making only approved purchases 
with the card and bears pecuniary liability to the U.S. 
Government for illegal purchases.  The cardholder is also 
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responsible to review mandatory sources of supply (in accordance 
with the Javits-Wagner-O’Day Act Program (JWOD), by screening 
items available from the Federal Prison Industries (FPI), and 
per the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act), to reconcile 
monthly billing statements from Citibank, act to resolve any 
discrepancies in those statements, and to certify monthly 
invoices for payment. 
AOs approve cardholder purchases, verify the monthly 
statements for each of their cardholders, and forward their 
certifications of those statements to the DFAS.  Upon AO 
certification of a cardholder’s monthly statement, DFAS pays 
Citibank for the validated transactions.  
 Level five APCs perform a number of responsibilities in 
addition to overseeing the training of cardholders and AOs.  
APCs manage the issuance of GCPC cards within their units, 
coordinate with higher-level APCs, monitor the activities of 
their AOs and cardholders, and coordinate with Citibank when 
necessary to help resolve discrepancies.  They conduct monthly 
transactional reviews of the purchases of all their subordinate 
cardholders, attempting to identify any questionable card 
activity for additional investigation.  They also ensure the 
accuracy of their cardholder account profiles at least quarterly 
and are responsible to conduct semi-annual reviews of the 
functioning of their local programs.  
 In addition to these administrative personnel, 
EBUSOPSOFFINST 4200.1A specifies that a unit Review Official (RO) 
audit AO certifications monthly using stratified statistical 
random sampling methods.  If at all possible the RO, although a 
member of the same unit as the AO and cardholder, is not to be a 
member of the AO’s supervisory chain-of-command.  The RO's 
function is to provide an additional screen to help ensure the 
validity of cardholder purchases and the timeliness of 
cardholder and AO certifications. 
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Fraud, Waste, and Abuse 
 
As highlighted in the DoD Charge Card Task Force Final 
Report of June 27, 2002 and the October, 2002 GAO testimony on 
Navy purchase card vulnerabilities, significant weaknesses have 
existed in GCPC program internal control throughout the DoN (as 
shown in numerous other audits and internal investigations) as 
well as the DoD and other federal agencies.  These weaknesses, 
which include lack of adherence to key internal controls and 
shortcomings in the GCPC program’s management culture and 
supporting infrastructure,9 have drawn increasing managerial 
attention within the department since implementation of the 
program.  In recent years, efforts to improve the GCPC program 
internal control environment appear to have focused principally 
on developing better means to identify fraud and other card 
misuse. 
In addition to improved fraud identification and auditing 
tools, such as the development of data-mining capabilities, 
training of GCPC program administrators and cardholders has also 
been enhanced.  These improvements to GCPC program training 
represent attempts to implement preventive measures to 
complement the more reactive tools designed to help identify 
fraud and card misuse after it occurs. 
From our examination of internal control theory, Lieutenant 
Colonel Darling and I concluded additional potential exists to 
further improve the GCPC program internal control environment.  
As discussed by Joseph T. Wells, founder of the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners, in his 1997 book, Occupational Fraud 
and Abuse, there are identifiable factors common to fraud within 
organizations.  Wells argued that for fraud to occur there must 
exist three legs of support for a fraud triangle; those legs 
consist of incentive, opportunity, and rationalization.  
Incentive means the perpetrator of the fraud has something 
to gain; not all such gains need be monetary.  As is intuitively 
obvious, the opportunity to commit fraud must exist, or fraud is 
impossible for an individual no matter how much he might desire 
to steal from his organization.  And finally, particularly for 
otherwise honest individuals, the ability to rationalize an 
illicit action acts as a critical enabler of fraud.  The fraud 
triangle is depicted in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
9. GAO Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management 
   and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of  
   Representatives, p. 2. 
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According to the fraud triangle theory, one way to help 
ensure an adequate internal control environment is to limit an 
individual’s ability to rationalize illicit activities.  By 
lessening the ability of an individual to convince himself that 
his actions are justifiable (due to perceived urgency of need, 
that he deserves or requires an item despite existing guidance 
or instructions to the contrary, that an action can be construed 
as within the larger meaning of those instructions, etc.), an 
organization should be able to lower the probability that 
members of that organization will commit fraud against it.   
Undoubtedly, because the GCPC program provides individuals 
access to large amounts of government credit, an incentive to 
commit fraud is inherent in the program.  Likewise, cardholders 
and program administrators have numerous opportunities to steal 
from the government or otherwise misuse GCPC program cards.  The 
potential for fraudulent use of cards ranges from a cardholder 
purchasing an item for his personal use and hoping it will not 
be noticed by the AO or APC during the bill reconciliation 
process to cardholders and administrators colluding to make 
split purchases (exceeding the $2,500 per purchase cap by 
splitting the purchase into two or more separate purchases). 
Although the potential for fraud in the GCPC program thus 
will always exist, automated control measures (such as 
restrictions on where purchases can be made), verification 
requirements, and receipt and audit procedures can largely 
suffice to identify illicit card use.  These types of controls, 
coupled with the purchasing limits in place on individual cards, 
help ensure fraud will be prevented or identified, as well as 
monetarily limiting any one individual’s ability to defraud the 
government. 
 
 
Rationalization 
 
Many government employees, and many Marines, who have made 
illicit purchases with their GCPC cards or who have ignored 
existing, mandatory internal controls and established internal 
control processes, would not consider themselves thieves.  
Whether purchasing a sandwich at Subway or bedding and towels 
for a visiting foreign military officer (both examples of GCPC 
card misuse documented in the Marine Corps’ semi-annual review 
of the GCPC program for the first half of FY-03), otherwise 
trusted and diligent government employees who improperly used 
their government purchase cards often did so for items which 
involved very low dollar amounts or did not directly benefit 
themselves.  It is likely they saw those purchases as not truly 
representing fraud against the government of the United States.  
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With an incentive and an opportunity, an individual need 
only be able to rationalize a questionable purchase to 
significantly enhance his potential to commit fraud or otherwise 
misuse a GCPC program card.  Even for those making comparatively 
large illicit purchases, there is likely to exist at the root of 
the fraud a rationalization that at the time, in the eyes of the 
purchaser, justified the transaction. 
Our ability to see the illegitimacy of those 
rationalizations (and the fact that the ability to rationalize a 
wrongful action does not make it justifiable) is not the point.  
The point is that the ability to rationalize card fraud, misuse, 
and abuse contributes to the poor internal control environment 
existing in the GCPC program.  The recommendations offered in 
the remainder of this article are designed to counter the 
ability of those administering the GCPC program, particularly 
cardholders, to rationalize wrongful use of GCPC program cards. 
 
 
Recommendations to Improve the GCPC Program 
 
 The analysis contained within the NPS thesis upon which 
this article is based led the authors of that thesis to 
recommend four changes to the GCPC program as it is currently 
administered within the Marine Corps.  Three of those 
recommendations were designed to directly combat the potential 
for rationalization of illicit card use the authors believed 
inherent in the current program; those three recommendations are 
encapsulated in the following paragraphs.  Although these 
recommendations have no potential to prevent willful theft by 
illicit use of GCPC program cards, they can help lessen the 
potential for GCPC program cardholders and administrators to 
rationalize illicit use of the cards.  These recommendations are 
to: convert the GCPC cards from individually named credit cards 
to unit cards with personalized numbers; to change the 
appearance of the cards; and to provide electronic receipts of 
all cardholder transactions daily to AOs and APCs. 
 GCPC program purchase cards are issued with the 
cardholder’s name embossed on them as an internal control 
measure.  Since only the individual cardholder can make 
purchases with the card (as only his/her name is on it), it is 
relatively simple to establish who made a questionable purchase.  
However, since the cards are similar in appearance to non-
government credit cards and since the individual’s name appears 
on the card, there is a risk that an individual may mistake the 
GCPC card for his/her personal credit card or be able to 
rationalize illicit use of the GCPC program card as it is 
“his/hers” because it bears his/her name.  Particularly for 
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individuals with little experience in financial management prior 
to entering the service, the issuance of a credit card with 
their name on it, which looks strikingly similar to a personal 
credit card, may be providing them an undeserved sense of 
entitlement to the use of the card.  It is also unnecessary.   
The DoN’s current service contract with Citibank does not 
limit the structure of its GCPC card accounts, meaning whether 
the cards are issued to individuals or to organizations is 
determinable by the DoN.  By issuing the GCPC program cards with 
unit identifiers instead of personal names embossed on the front 
of the cards while associating card numbers to individual 
cardholders, the DoN can negate much of the potential for 
rationalization inherent in the current program while 
maintaining a high level of card use accountability.  To 
accomplish this would require modification to the current GCPC 
cards. 
The recommendation contained in the NPS thesis for a 
revised GCPC unit card is depicted in Figure 5.  The card would 
still be issued directly from Citibank to the cardholder but 
would not bear the cardholder’s name.  For accountability and to 
establish pecuniary liability to the cardholder, the last four 
digits of the card would be used to identify the individual 
cardholder.  APCs and HAs would have increased interest in 
ensuring detaching cardholders returned their cards and had 
their accounts deactivated as the cards would be directly 
associable to the unit instead of to the individual cardholders.  
As is true of the program as currently administered, the 
cardholder would have sole access to his GCPC card while serving 
as a cardholder, yet one potential source of the ability of a 
cardholder to rationalize illicit purchases (believing the card 
to be his because his name is on it) would be eliminated. 
According to the Camp Pendleton, CA, APC, cardholders had 
sometimes explained that their illicit GCPC purchases were 
simple mistakes made because their GCPC program cards looked too 
much like their other, personal credit cards.  Changing the GCPC 
program card appearance to make it more distinctive is an 
obvious solution to this type of confusion experienced by 
cardholders.  The current GCPC program card, depicted in Figure 
4, is very visually appealing and contains the sentence “For 
Official US Government Purchases Only” in faint, extremely small 
print under a large heading reading “United States of America.”  
In addition to GCPC cardholder confusion, vendors seeing the 
large “VISA” symbol and the embossed cardholder’s name can 
themselves easily overlook the tiny official purchase warning. 
Although one benefit of the current appearance of the GCPC 
card is likely its unquestioned acceptance by commercial vendors 
as it looks largely like any other personal credit card, the 
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card’s appearance can be modified to eliminate any cardholder 
perception that the card isn’t as “official” as it is in reality.  
As depicted in Figure 5, a redesigned GCPC program card, while 
still visually appealing, would bear the issuing unit’s name 
instead of the individual cardholder’s name and a statement in 
large print “FOR OFFICIAL US GOVERNMENT PURCHASES ONLY, 
CARDHOLDER VIOLATIONS SUBJECT TO 31 U.S.C 3528.”  A GCPC 
cardholder should find it much more difficult to mistake such a 
redesigned card for a personal credit card or to rationalize 
unauthorized purchases. 
Lastly, AOs and APCs could be provided electronic receipts 
of all cardholder transactions on a daily basis instead of just 
at the end of the billing cycle (in the monthly billing 
statement from Citibank).  As stated in the 2002 DoD Charge Card 
Task Force Final Report, "...the most critical management 
controls in the purchase card program are the monthly review and 
approval of the cardholder’s statement by the approving 
official…"10
Citibank currently provides an on-line capability to data-
mine account transaction activity for all GCPC accounts and APCs 
and AOs are required to review, and AOs to certify, their 
cardholders’ accounts on a monthly basis.  Yet technology could 
easily make review of account statuses a daily activity for APCs 
and AOs by automatically providing them an account summary on a 
daily versus monthly basis.   
     APCs and AOs, screening their cardholder transactions daily, 
would no longer face the deluge of end of billing cycle 
verifications which presently confront them.  This monthly 
deluge, along with the requirement to quickly complete the 
verification and certification processes, can tempt GCPC program 
administrators to perform a less than detailed review of their 
cardholders’ monthly transactional activities.  Even the most 
diligent auditor is more likely to miss identifying a 
questionable transaction when faced with reviewing an entire 
month’s activities by all his cardholders, while also trying to 
complete his review quickly to ensure his certification is 
submitted on time.  The necessity to review transactions daily 
would also add a level of discipline to the present review and 
certification process.  Since the requirement to review and 
certify all cardholder transactions already exists, daily review 
only disciplines, instead of adding to, the completion of 
current requirements. 
Additionally, cardholders, well aware that each transaction 
would be reviewed by both the AO and the APC the day the 
purchase was made, would be less able to rationalize  
 
 
9. DoD Charge Card Task Force Final Report, p. 2-4. 
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questionable purchases.  The knowledge that any such purchases 
would be more likely to be immediately identified would help 
negate the potential for cardholders to self-justify illicit 
card use by believing such use to be unlikely to be detected. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Fraud may not be fully preventable in any procurement 
process or program.  Some incentive will always exist to steal, 
as will some opportunity to commit fraud.  Likewise, even well 
designed internal controls have little impact in preventing 
fraud if they are not effectively implemented.  In the GCPC 
program, the internal controls thus far in use to limit fraud, 
waste, and abuse with program cards may be better at detecting 
fraud and misuse after it occurs than in preventing it in the 
first place.  Certainly the types of difficulties in internal 
control implicit in the opening quote to this article indicate 
there is room to improve in prevention of fraud within the GCPC 
program. 
 Breakdowns in internal controls are both extraordinarily 
easy to envision and exceedingly difficult to prevent.  For 
example, if an AO, pressed for time, does not actually review 
all the transactions for a particular cardholder and instead 
simply certifies the invoice to ensure it is submitted on time, 
there exists a potential for fraud to escape detection.  If a 
unit, due to personnel limitations for instance, does not really 
separate the duties of purchasing, receipting for, and 
inventorying purchased items, the GCPC cardholder making the 
purchase has ample opportunity to defraud the government. 
As long as an incentive and the potential to commit fraud 
or other card misuse exists within the GCPC program, the key to 
prevention is likely to be found in limiting the ability of 
individuals to rationalize illicit purchases.  In recent years, 
much has been done to limit the opportunity for individuals to 
perpetrate fraud within the GCPC program and to improve the 
ability of program administrators to detect fraud or card misuse 
when it occurs; however, those initiatives can completely 
eliminate neither the incentive nor the opportunity for fraud 
and card misuse.  If they could, they would have already 
accomplished that purpose.  By implementing the recommendations 
contained within this paper, the Marine Corps and other 
organizations can limit the ability of individuals to 
rationalize illicit use of GCPC program cards and improve the 
GCPC program internal control environment.  
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(Amounts calculated in thousands) 
FY 03  DoD Purchase Card Usage US Bank and Citibank  
  Total Accounts Fiscal Year thru 30 Sep 03 TOTAL 
Agency  B/O C/H Sales  Transactions Rebates 
Navy (17) 4,823 19,807 $1,853,181 2,539 $4,436 
Army 
(21) 26,202 66,922 $3,026,240 4,510 $19,837 
Air Force 
(57&58)  19,294 47,437 $1,757,483 3,018 $14,039 
Defense 
Agencies 
(97) 
3,108 7,207 $   599,072 666 $2,769 
            
Totals  53,427 141,373 $7,235,977 10,735 $ 36,082 
        
 
Figure 1. FY-03 DoD Purchase Card Usage. (From: 
http://purchasecard.saalt.army.mil//03metrics.htm, 31 Oct 2003) 
 
 Figure 2.  Purchase Card Hierarchy Diagram. (From: DoN 
EBUSOPSOFFINST 4200.1A, p. 13) 
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Figure 3.  The Fraud Triangle. (From: 
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/jan2003/ramos.htm) 
 
The GCPC program card of today: 
 
 
 
The current card looks 
like a personal credit 
card and bears the 
cardholder's name
 
 
Figure 4. 
 
The GCPC program card of tomorrow: 
 
These last four digits 
would be different for 
every user; the numbers 
would identify the card’s 
authorized user 
The unit name would 
replace the individual 
cardholder’s name here 
Figure 5. 
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